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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ONE LANGUAGE, MANY REALITIES:1 AN INTERPRETATION OF
LANGUAGE, LAW, AND SECTION 215(A)(3) OF THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT

INTRODUCTION
What do lawyers do? This question yields a mélange of answers.2
Nonetheless, the majority of people share “central notions about lawyering: a
lawyer is a litigator, . . . [one who is] knowledgeable about both legal doctrine
and procedure,”3 and who “engage[s] in . . . prototypically lawyerly
endeavor[s].”4 To perform prototypically lawyerly endeavors, such as drafting
pleadings or arguing motions, lawyers rely on words. As such, the practice of
law involves more than rights, obligations, and procedure.5 “The law is a
profession of words.”6
Most people, including those in the legal profession, would agree that legal
language7 tends to be complex or confusing.8 In fact, legal language has been
characterized as a “specialized tongue”9 and has earned such a designation for
a handful of reasons. First, those who draft laws, contracts, and legal
memoranda regularly employ common words in uncommon ways.10 Second,
laws and other legal documents often include words that have unfixed or
flexible meanings.11 Third, legal language tends to be populated by Latin
words and phrases.12 Additionally, the complexity of legal language is
1. BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE, at xi (2d ed. 2003).
2. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories About Lawyering,
29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 555, 555 (1980).
3. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 325 (1995).
4. Id. at 324.
5. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW, at vii (1963).
6. Id.
7. In this Comment, the phrase “legal language” includes, but is not limited to, laws,
contracts, leases, pleadings, court orders, and opinions.
8. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1977) (“I
have not encountered a single lawyer, judge, or scholar who views existing case-law as anything
but a chaos of confused argument which ought to be set right if one only knew how.”); Brandt
Goldstein, Lost in Translation? Some Brief Notes on Writing About Law for the Layperson, 52
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2008).
9. MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 11.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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compounded by language itself:13 language is durable, precise, yet temporary
and inexact.14 America’s English is “as absorbent as a sponge, as flexible as a
rubber band, and it simply won’t stand still.”15 “Change may be [one of
English’s] greatest strength[s] . . . .”16 On the other hand, change may be “the
source of a lot of unnecessary angst[,]”17 particularly when it frustrates a
principal purpose of language, which is to communicate.18
The malleability of language together with the hallmarks of legal
language19 tend to aid and abet litigation.20 If a law is subject to varying
interpretations by various individuals, “parties having an interest in what is
meant may . . . ask the court to come up with its interpretation,”21 and the
court’s interpretation often hinges upon the meaning of a single word.22
Ambiguous legal language, aside from encouraging litigation, also gives
rise to an interdisciplinary study: the nexus between language (linguistics) and
the law. From this vantage point, a series of questions crystallize. First, “[t]o
what extent should we worry about . . . defining words—that is, about . . .
getting the law right?”23 Second, how is the law to endure if words do not?24
Third, can communities be governed effectively by vague laws?25 Certain

13. See id. at 396 (“The language of the law shares the imperfections of the common
language and of language itself.”).
14. See ANATOLY LIBERMAN, WORD ORIGINS . . . AND HOW WE KNOW THEM:
ETYMOLOGY FOR EVERYONE 191, 250 (2005). “Words change both their phonetic shape and
meaning . . . . This is not a trivial statement. We understand the oldest people around us and our
great-grandchildren, and the ease of communication emphasizes the stability of language. Some
words appear and disappear in our lifetime . . . .” Id. at 157.
15. PATRICIA T. O’CONNER & STEWART KELLERMAN, ORIGINS OF THE SPECIOUS: MYTHS
AND MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, at xvi (2009).
16. Id. at xvii.
17. Id.
18. S.-Y. Kuroda, Some Thoughts on the Foundations of the Theory of Language Use, 3
LINGUISTICS & PHIL., no. 1, 1979 at 1, 3 (1979) (“Language is most commonly considered to be a
means of communication, to be, in fact, the system of communication par excellence.”).
19. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
21. SANFORD SCHANE, LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 12 (2006).
22. MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 397 (“Nowhere else can so much hinge on a word—not
merely billions of dollars, but weightier intangibles . . . .”); see Frigaliment Importing Co. v.
B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (interpreting the word
“chicken”); United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705, 706 (2d
Cir. 1934) (interpreting the word “obscene”); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126,
127–28 (1998) (interpreting the word “carries”).
23. Bryan A. Garner, Legal Lexicography: A View from the Front Lines, 6 GREEN BAG 2D
151, 151 (2003).
24. MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 437 (“Change the words; you lose the law.”).
25. Timothy Endicott, Law Is Necessarily Vague, 7 LEGAL THEORY 379, 379 (2001)
[hereinafter Endicott, Law Is Necessarily Vague].
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scholars have argued that vague laws have a place in society.26 However,
imprecise laws displace definite bounds and create uncertainty in places where
certainty is desired and necessary.
For instance, vague employment laws can be detrimental to the
workplace,27 in part, because laws that govern the employer-employee
relationship “aim to regulate . . . a wide range of personal interactions.”28 In
fact, data shows that employment law is “‘the fastest growing area of litigation
in the country.’”29 Legal commentator Walter Olson pins the rise of
employment litigation on the nature of new employment laws.30 He suggests
that new employment laws “tend to avoid giving employers definite rules to
obey but instead lay out sweeping if vague aspirations.”31
Olson’s characterization of new employment laws resonates with the
majority’s interpretation of Section 215(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“Act”), a statutory regime that is not so new.32 Most courts have construed
the scope of the Act’s anti-retaliation provision liberally.33 Apparently,
Olson’s description of new employment laws—they “lay out sweeping if
vague aspirations”34—is an apt description of old employment laws, too.
Notwithstanding the majority’s liberal interpretation of the Act’s antiretaliation provision, the Seventh Circuit in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp. declined to follow suit.35

26. See id. (arguing that “precision is not always useful in regulating communities”).
27. See Mark A. Rothstein, Serge A. Martinez & W. Paul McKinney, Using Established
Medical Criteria to Define Disability: A Proposal to Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act,
80 WASH. U. L. Q. 243, 244 (2002) (“The vagueness of the definition of ‘individual with a
disability’ has frustrated employers and other parties responsible for complying with ADA
requirements. It has also left individuals uncertain of whether they have standing to ask for the
reasonable accommodations reserved under the law for individuals with ‘covered’ disabilities.”);
Disabilities Act Raises Questions for Employers Over Health Insurance, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 51, at A–1 (Mar. 16, 1992) (“Many private-sector employers are confused about their health
insurance obligations under the Americans With Disabilities Act . . . .”).
28. See WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY 3 (1997).
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See Willis J. Nordlund, A Brief History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 39 LAB. L.J.
715, 721 (1988) (explaining the implementation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which became
effective on October 24, 1938).
33. Cooke v. Rosenker, 601 F. Supp. 2d 64, 74 (D.C.C. 2009) (“The Courts of Appeals for
the First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that an
informal complaint to an employer can constitute protected activity for purposes of the FLSA.”).
34. OLSON, supra note 28, at 3.
35. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2009),
(“[W]e believe that the FLSA’s use of the phrase ‘file any complaint’ requires a plaintiff
employee to submit some sort of writing . . . .”), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.),
and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
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Section 215(a)(3) of the Act makes it “unlawful for any person . . . to
discharge . . . any employee because such employee has filed any complaint.”36
In Kasten, a former employee desired to invoke the aegis of Section
215(a)(3).37 The substantive issue presented by this case is whether purely oral
complaints constitute “filing” a complaint and thereby trigger the Act’s
protection.38 The lion’s share of the court’s analysis concerned the contours of
the word “filed.”39 The breadth of the statutory text, “filed any complaint,”
engendered a circuit split.40 However, the Supreme Court resolved the split on
March 22, 2011.41
The judiciary’s interpretation of the word “filed” has inspired the
following query: Should tribunals, when interpreting the meaning of statutory
text, be mindful of both linguistic and legal concerns? This Comment explores
the ambit of Section 215(a)(3) and examines the implications of the law’s
relation to language and language’s relation to the law. Part I provides a brief
introduction to the Act’s anti-retaliation clause and summarizes the bifurcated
interpretations of the text “filed any complaint.” Part II discusses the
confluence of language and the law and details the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation of Section 215(a)(3). Part III provides an overview of statutory
construction, surveys the analytical tools employed by lower courts, and
canvasses the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of the Act. Part IV summarizes
oral arguments heard by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court’s ruling, and
considers the implications of the Court’s opinion. This author argues that the
Supreme Court should have affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling; by doing so,
the Court would have preserved a venerable piece of federal legislation and
resisted the commission of verbicide.42

36. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
37. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 837.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 838–40.
40. Cooke v. Rosenker, 601 F. Supp. 2d 64, 74 (D.C.C. 2009).
There is some disagreement among the circuits whether an informal or internal complaint
constitutes “any complaint” within the meaning of Section 215(a)(3). The Courts of
Appeals for the First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
concluded that an informal complaint to an employer can constitute protected activity for
purposes of the FLSA. . . . On the other hand, the Second and Fourth Circuits have ruled
that an informal complaint to an employer is not protected activity under the FLSA.
Id. See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1007–08 (9th Cir. 1999); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs.,
Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 43 (1st Cir. 1999); Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d 1546, 1549–50 (8th Cir. 1994);
Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993), overruled by Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985,
989–90 (6th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989).
41. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1325, 1335 (2011).
42. See infra Part IV.E and note 380 (explaining that verbicide occurs when an entity ignores
the accepted meaning of a word, thereby weakening its value and clarity).
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I. BACKGROUND
The Act endeavors to standardize rules that govern the workforce43 and
promote fairness at the workplace.44 The Act has three overarching goals: (1)
to establish minimum wages; (2) to devise a schedule for overtime pay; and (3)
to eliminate child labor.45 The linchpin of this statutory scheme is its
“remedial and humanitarian . . . purpose.”46
Franklin D. Roosevelt characterized the Act as “the most far-reaching, farsighted, program for the benefit of workers ever adopted here or in any other
country.”47 As of late, this piece of legislation furnishes protection to over 130
million American workers.48 Signed into law in 1938, the Act has been
amended a handful of times,49 perhaps because it “imposes basic labor
standards.”50
A.

The Act’s Anti-Retaliation Provision
Section 215(a)(3) of the Act makes it unlawful for an employer:
to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because
such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted
any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to
testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry
51
committee . . . .

The Act’s anti-retaliation provision contains three discrete clauses:52 the
complaint clause,53 the testimony clause,54 and the industry committee

43. Nordlund, supra note 32, at 720–21.
44. See id.
45. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, §§ 6–7, 12, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062–
63, 1067; E. Merrick Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941–1945, 59
HARV. L. REV. 321, 321 (1946).
46. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944).
47. Nordlund, supra note 32, at 715.
48. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #14: COVERAGE UNDER THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) 1 (July 2009), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/
whdfs14.pdf.
49. Nordlund, supra note 32, at 724.
50. Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 433, 436 (E.D. Va. 2009) (emphasis
added).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
52. O’Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661, 663 (E.D. Va. 1997).
Specifically, § 215(a)(3) prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions
against employees who assert their FLSA rights in three enumerated ways. Thus,
employees trigger the anti-retaliation provision when they have either: (1) “filed any
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceedings” under the FLSA; (2)
“testified or is about to testify in any [FLSA] proceeding”; or (3) “served or is about to
serve on an industry committee”.
Id.
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clause.55 Judicial intervention is triggered if an employee files any complaint,
testifies or will testify in a proceeding, or has served or will serve on an
industry committee.56 Accordingly, to present a claim of retaliation under
Section 215(a)(3), an employee must have engaged in one of the provision’s
enumerated categories of protected conduct.57
Section 215(a)(3) of the Act provides a safe harbor for employees who
report an employer’s violation of the Act.58 In addition to encouraging
employee reporting, Section 215(a)(3) doubles as an enforcement mechanism59
since “Congress did not seek to secure compliance with [the Act’s] standards
through continuing detailed federal supervision . . . . Rather it chose to rely on
information and complaints received from employees . . . .”60 As such, the Act
serves its purpose only if “employees fe[el] free to approach officials [and
supervisors] with their grievances.”61
B.

The Act’s Complaint Clause

The Act’s complaint clause, which has garnered judicial attention for
years,62 prohibits adverse employment action against an employee who has
“filed any complaint.”63 Courts across the country have interpreted the reach
of this statutory text.64 Most lower courts have prioritized form over
substance;65 that is, they gloss over the content of the complaint and focus
more on its delivery.66 To determine whether Section 215(a)(3) applies to the
parties’ dispute, lower courts have addressed two recurring issues: one
53. Minor, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 436. (“[T]he ‘complaint clause’ . . . proscribes discharge of an
employee who ‘has filed any complaint or instituted . . . any proceeding’ related to the
FLSA . . . .”).
54. Id. (“[T]he ‘testimony clause’ . . . forbids dismissal of an employee who ‘has testified or
is about to testify in any . . . proceeding’ under or related to the FLSA.”).
55. See Sandt v. Holden, 698 F. Supp. 64, 68–69 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (discussing the third
clause of Section 215(a)(3): serving on an industry committee).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006); Sandt, 698 F. Supp. at 68.
57. O’Neill, 956 F. Supp. at 664 (“Thus, unless the conduct claimed to be the trigger for the
retaliatory act falls within one of the three specified protected activity categories, the provision
does not apply and there is no actionable retaliation under the FLSA.”).
58. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
59. Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d 1546, 1550 (8th Cir. 1994).
60. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292.
61. Id.
62. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
64. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
65. Jennifer Clemons, FLSA Retaliation: A Continuum of Employee Protection, 53 BAYLOR
L. REV. 535, 541 (2001) (“The basic issue over which the circuits disagree is the degree of
formality with which an employee must complain to be engaging in statutorily protected
activity.”); see, e.g., Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 1999).
66. Clemons, supra note 65, at 541.
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concerns the phrase “any complaint,” and the other relates to the meaning of
the word “filed.”67 With respect to the phrase “any complaint,” there is some
inconsistency among courts about whether an internal complaint constitutes
protected activity.68 However, most circuits agree that intra-corporate
complaints trigger the protection of Section 215(a)(3).69
Unlike the more settled analysis of the text “any complaint,” the meaning
of the word “filed” has produced conflicting interpretations, namely because
courts disagree about the character of formality required by the statute’s
language.70 Some courts have held that purely oral complaints satisfy the
language of the statute.71 Such circuits champion a liberal construction of the
verb “filed”72 and have reasoned that the phrase “filed any complaint” is
susceptible to differing interpretations.73 These circuits, when analyzing the
ambit of Section 215(a)(3), have deferred to the statute’s “remedial and
humanitarian . . . purpose.”74 Thus, the statute’s ambiguous language in
conjunction with the Act’s remedial purpose have convinced a number of
courts that Section 215(a)(3) of the Act is entitled to a broad interpretation.75
Conversely, courts that have conferred a narrow interpretation on the Act’s
anti-retaliation clause have concluded that the language of the “provision could
scarcely be clearer.”76 A Virginia court explained: “[Section 215(a)(3) of the
Act] defines in clear and unambiguous language three specific categories of

67. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 838–40 (7th
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
68. See infra note 69.
69. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838 (finding that the language of Section 215(a)(3) includes internal
corporate complaints); Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 625–26 (5th Cir. 2008)
(stating that internal corporate complaints are covered under the Act’s anti-retaliation provision).
But see Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining that internal
complaints filed by employees do not constitute protected activity.); Minor v. Bostwick Labs.,
Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 433, 440 (E.D. Va. 2009) (holding that “intra-company complaints made by
an employee to her supervisors” do not trigger the protection of the Act’s anti-retaliation clause).
70. Jennifer Lynne Redmond, Are You Breaking Some Sort of Law?: Protecting an
Employee’s Informal Complaints Under the Fair Labor Standards Act’s Anti-Retaliation
Provision, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 325 (2000).
71. Id. at 325 n.44.
72. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1999).
73. See id. at 1004.
74. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944).
75. Id. (“But these provisions, like the other portions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, are
remedial and humanitarian in purpose. . . . Such a statute must not be interpreted or applied in a
narrow, grudging manner.”); Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 1999)
(“Moreover, ‘the remedial nature of the statute further warrants an expansive interpretation of its
provisions . . . .’”); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir. 1987) (“The Fair Labor
Standards Act is part of the large body of humanitarian and remedial legislation enacted during
the Great Depression, and has been liberally interpreted.”); Clemons, supra note 65, at 553.
76. O’Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661, 663 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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conduct for which retaliation is prohibited. And it does so in terms that make
unmistakably clear that the three categories of conduct comprise the complete
universe of protected activity . . . .”77 Because some judges have found that the
phrase “filed any complaint” is plain and clear, they refused to expand the
reach of the statute.78 Thus, pursuant to a narrow interpretation, only written
complaints entitle employees to invoke the protection of the Act’s antiretaliation clause.79
II. LAW, LANGUAGE, AND THE ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION
Lawyers, judges, and legislators “have been advised . . . to write plainly,
sensibly, simply, clearly, succinctly, interestingly, [and] forcibly.”80
Nonetheless, most would agree that legal language is far from plain, sensible,
simple, or clear.81 The law’s lack of clarity often inspires legal disputes, and
disputants often seek judicial intervention.82 “One look at any digest of
cases . . . brings [about] a conviction of [the law’s] imprecision” and the
resulting popularity of judicial intervention.83 As such, there must be a reason
(or several) why legal language is, at times, imprecise. Part II of this Comment
explores some of these explanations and addresses the legal and linguistic
concerns that accompany the interpretation of law.

77. Id. at 663–64.
78. Sapperstein, 188 F.3d at 857 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno,
494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990)) (“The starting point for the interpretation of a statute ‘is the language
of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’”).
79. Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The plain language of this
provision limits the cause of action to retaliation for filing formal complaints, instituting a
proceeding, or testifying, but does not encompass complaints made to a supervisor.”), overruled
by Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); Minor v.
Bostwick Labs., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 433, 439 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“Further support for the Court’s
conclusion that the complaint clause does not protect an employee against retaliation for informal,
intra-company complaints such as Minor’s is found by comparing the circumscribed language
employed in § 215(a)(3) with Title VII’s considerably broader anti-retaliation provision.”);
O’Neill, 956 F. Supp. at 665 (quoting Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d at 55) (“‘[T]he plain language of [§
215(a)(3) ] limits the cause of action to retaliation for filing complaints, instituting a proceeding,
or testifying, but does not encompass complaints made to a supervisor.’”).
80. MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 287–88.
81. Id. at 386–87 (explaining that the imprecision of legal language results in a myriad of
paradoxical questions about its use and development).
82. See id. at 387 (the outcome of litigation often “turn[s] repeatedly (and in many
directions) on the interpretation not of layman’s words but of law words”).
83. Id.
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The Limits of Language

Legal language is imprecise, in part, because language itself is imprecise
and imperfect.84 Many people, including judges, have recognized the
shortcomings of language.85 One such shortcoming arises from the “the
inherent malleability of language.”86 Language is flexible, vulnerable, and
tolerant, and its natural fluidity and accessibility invite speakers to tweak or
transform the sound, shape, and meaning of words.87 Having recognized the
malleability of language, the Third Circuit issued the following admonishment:
if “regulations [are] to have significance, we must recognize limits on the
malleability of words.”88 That is to say, because the law is expressed in words,
and the meaning of words changes over time, the law should not blindly
uphold such changes. Additionally, “words do not maintain a strict one-to-one
relation with the things symbolised [sic].”89 Courts have recognized this
reality and refer to it as the “one-word-one-meaning . . . fallacy.”90
Aside from language itself, the legal profession’s adherence to tradition
may also explain why ambiguity lurks in the law. In fact, “[m]any of the
words that lawyers traditionally use never have had any definite meaning.”91
“Words like reasonable, substantial, satisfactory . . . blatantly flaunt their lack
of precision.”92 One legal scholar who has recognized the role of tradition in
legal language opined “[w]ere it not for the fact that they have been used
repeatedly, traditionally by other lawyers, no lawyer alive would independently
choose any of these words.”93

84. Id. at 396–97.
85. See supra notes 13–15, 17 and accompanying text.
86. Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 698 (2003) (explaining that the
plaintiff’s construction of the statute at issue “is hardly satisfied by the malleability of the term
‘maintain”‘); Broderick v. 119TCbay, LLC, 670 F. Supp. 2d 612, 616 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (noting
that “‘[l]anguage, as compared to mathematics, is inherently imprecise. Scant few words or
phrases have one and only one meaning in all climates’”) (citation omitted).
87. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text; infra notes 94–97 and accompanying
text.
88. Revak v. Nat’l Mines Corp., 808 F.2d 996, 1004 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Watson v.
United States, 552 U.S. 74, 83 (2007) (reasoning that “law depends on respect for language”).
89. FREDERICK A. PHILBRICK, LANGUAGE AND THE LAW: THE SEMANTICS OF FORENSIC
ENGLISH 26 (1949).
90. R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690, 696 (2d Cir. 1952); Irwin v. Simmons, 140
F.2d 558, 560 (2d Cir. 1944). Although courts have acknowledged that some words have flexible
or multiple meanings, courts do not entertain baseless interpretations of legal language; see
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
91. MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 301.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 304.
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A third cause of vagueness in the law relates to society’s use of language.
Speakers of language, intentionally or unintentionally, effect change through
use, misuse, and invention.94 Patricia O’Conner, who writes about language
and grammar, likens the “give-and-take of language” to “warfare.”95 “A word
bravely soldiers on for years, until one day it falls facedown in the trenches, its
original meaning a casualty of misuse. Unique is a good example: a crisp and
accurate word meaning ‘one of kind,’ now frequently degraded to merely
‘unusual.’”96 Because language is subservient to its users, “words appear and
disappear in our lifetime, stress can shift from the second syllable to the first,
and usage does not remain the same from decade to decade.”97
In sum, vagueness is endemic to legal language.98 As such, we must ask
whether vague laws are inimical or desirable. A host of scholars argue that
ambiguities in law are necessary and desireable.99 They claim that lawmakers
deliberately select ambiguous expressions in order to “confer[] discretion on a
court to formulate an individual norm by choosing from those meanings.”100
Another argument in favor of imprecise legal language is that laws are
designed to regulate a range of conduct, and to best effectuate that purpose,
laws should be abstract.101 Ambiguous expressions, thus, facilitate the
regulation of “human activity in a general way.”102 Some scholars believe that
“to pursue precision—or even to avoid significant vagueness” is undesirable
because “[l]aw, like language, should not make arbitrary, pointless
distinctions.”103 This line of reasoning ignores the advantages that coincide
with distinctions, even those perceived as arbitrary.104

94. See O’CONNER & KELLERMAN, supra note 15, at xvii, 43, 153 (explaining how common
or colloquial use over hundreds of years and the merging of several languages have led to
ambiguities and multiple meanings for many recognized words).
95. PATRICIA T. O’CONNER, WOE IS I: THE GRAMMARPHOBE’S GUIDE TO BETTER ENGLISH
IN PLAIN ENGLISH 81 (1996).
96. Id.
97. LIBERMAN, supra note 14, at 157.
98. See supra notes 84–97 and accompanying text.
99. Endicott, Law Is Necessarily Vague, supra note 25, at 379 (“Law is vague because
precision is not always useful in regulating communities, and lawmakers know that.”); Timothy
A.O. Endicott, Vagueness and Legal Theory, 3 LEGAL THEORY 37, 63 (1997) (“Whether
vagueness is a necessary evil or a valuable legal technique, . . . [w]e can go so far as to say that
vagueness is an essential feature of law.”) [hereinafter Endicott, Vagueness and Legal Theory];
Kent Greenawalt, Vagueness and Judicial Responses to Legal Indeterminacy, 7 LEGAL THEORY
433, 435 (2001) (“The legislature may adopt a vague standard that is to be applied in the first
instance by an administrative agency.”).
100. Endicott, Vagueness and Legal Theory, supra note 99, at 43.
101. Endicott, Law Is Necessarily Vague, supra note 25, at 382.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 385.
104. Id. at 379–80.
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The pursuit of precise law yields note-worthy benefits.105 Precise law
“tells people governed by law where they stand[] and . . . avoids legal
disputes.”106 When vague laws give rise to legal disputes, litigants expect
courts to determine the “true” meaning of a word.107 The interpretation of
legal language unveils a tension between the seemingly fixed nature of law and
the unfixed nature of language. To minimize this tension, should courts, when
engaged in the interpretation of law, be entitled to re-write the law or re-shape
the English language? Further, should the judiciary consider a word’s
common usage and thereby empower language users to re-write the law?
These questions are raised obliquely by the Kasten case,108 a case that has
climbed the judicial ranks. On March 22, 2010, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation.109 By
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed to determine the “true” meaning
of the word “filed.”110 A year later, the Supreme Court handed down its
decision and defined, for all of America, the scope of the verb “filed.”111 Prior
to reaching America’s highest court, Kasten was first heard by the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.112 Following a judgment in favor
of Defendant Saint-Gobain, Plaintiff Kasten appealed.113 Accordingly, the
case was sent to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for review.114
B.

Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation: The Facts

Plaintiff Kevin Kasten alleged that Defendant Saint-Gobain violated
Section 215(a)(3) of the Act when Kasten was fired for complaining about the
location of Defendant’s time clocks.115 Kasten had been an hourly employee
of Saint-Gobain for approximately three years.116 Hourly employees are
required to “use a time card to swipe in and out of an on-site Kronos time

105. Id.
106. Endicott, Law is Necessarily Vague, supra note 25, at 379.
107. PHILBRICK, supra note 89, at 34.
108. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 837, 838–39 (7th
Cir. 2009) (construing the meaning of “file” to determine “whether unwritten verbal complaints
are protected activity”), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S. Ct.
1325 (2011).
109. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.).
110. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 837 (explaining that the crux of this case is “whether unwritten
verbal complaints are protected activity”).
111. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1325, 1336.
112. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 608, 609 (W.D.
Wis. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
113. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 835.
114. Id. at 834.
115. Id. at 837.
116. Id. at 836.
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clock.”117 Kasten received a disciplinary warning from Saint-Gobain that
concerned his use of Saint Gobain’s time clocks.118 The disciplinary warning
provided, “[i]f the same or any other violation occurs in the subsequent 12month period from this date of verbal reminder, a written warning may be
issued.”119 Roughly six months later, Kasten was issued a written warning
because of his improper use of Saint Gobain’s time clocks.120 This notice,
which was signed and acknowledged by Kasten himself, stated, “[i]f the same
or any other violation occurs in the subsequent 12-month period from this date
[sic] will result in further disciplinary action up to and including
termination.”121
Following the second warning, Kasten received a third warning for his
failure to clock in and out and a one-day suspension.122 Saint-Gobain notified
Kasten that if another violation were to occur, additional disciplinary actions
would be imposed and may include termination.123 Four weeks later, Kasten
failed to follow the company’s time clock policy, and Saint-Gobain suspended
him.124 Five days after he was suspended, Kasten was terminated.125
Kasten claimed that he orally complained to supervisors and human
resources personnel “about the legality of the location of Saint-Gobain’s time
clocks.”126 He believed that the placement of the “clocks prevented employees
from being paid for time spent donning and doffing their required protective
gear.”127 Kasten insisted that on four separate occasions, he complained about
the location of the time clocks.128 Saint-Gobain contended that Kasten never
complained about the location of its time clocks.129
C. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation: The Analysis
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Saint-Gobain,
“finding that Kasten had not engaged in protected activity because he had not
‘filed any complaint’ about the allegedly illegal location of the time clocks.”130
On review, the Seventh Circuit framed its analysis as a two-part inquiry: “first,

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Kasten, 570 F.3d at 836.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kasten, 570 F.3d at 836.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kasten, 570 F.3d at 836.
Id.
Id. at 837.
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whether intra-company complaints that are not formally filed with any judicial
or administrative body are protected activity; and second, whether unwritten
verbal complaints are protected activity.”131 The second inquiry obliged the
Seventh Circuit to determine the “true” meaning of the verb “filed.”132
1.

Intra-Corporate Complaints

The issue of whether internal complaints constitute protected activity under
the Act’s anti-retaliation provision was one of first impression for the Seventh
Circuit.133
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by referencing a
fundamental precept of statutory interpretation: “Statutory interpretation begins
with ‘the language of the statute itself [and] [a]bsent a clearly expressed
legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded
as conclusive.’”134 The Seventh Circuit held that the Act’s anti-retaliation
statute protects intra-corporate complaints as evinced by the adjective “any,”
which modifies the noun, “complaint.”135
The Seventh Circuit, for
interpretative guidance, engaged in groupthink when it took notice of other
courts’ conclusions on this issue.136
2.

Unwritten Oral Complaints

To determine whether unwritten oral complaints constitute protected
activity—in other words, to define the word “filed”—the Seventh Circuit
began its analysis by identifying the relevant language of the statute.137 Next,
the appellate court reviewed the district court’s findings and cited a portion of
the lower court’s opinion,138 which provided: “By definition, the word ‘file’
refers to ‘a collection of papers, records, etc., arranged in a convenient
order,’ . . . or . . . ‘[t]o deliver (a paper or instrument) to the proper officer so
that it is received by him to kept [sic] on file, or among the records of his
office . . . .’”139 Each definition contains direct, explicit references to a paper,
a writing.
Plaintiff Kasten urged the Seventh Circuit to adopt a different definition of
the word “filed.”140 He argued that “filed” has multiple meanings, one of

131. Id.
132. Id. at 838–40.
133. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 837.
134. Id. at 837–38 (quoting Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 1999)).
135. Id. at 838.
136. Id. (citing opinions from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
circuits).
137. Id.
138. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 838–39.
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which is “to submit.”141 To assess the validity of Plaintiff’s contention, the
Seventh Circuit considered the verb’s connotation.142 The court reasoned that
“[t]he use of the verb ‘to file’ connotes the use of a writing.”143 Next, the
appellate court considered the word’s denotation and consulted Webster’s
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary.144 Webster’s Dictionary defines the verb “to
file” as: “1. to arrange in order for preservation and reference <‘file letters’>
2. a: to place among official records as prescribed by law <‘file a mortgage’>
b: to perform the first act of (as a lawsuit) <‘threatened to file charges against
him’>.”145 The entries in Webster’s Dictionary lent ex post facto support to
the lower court’s findings and reinforced the Seventh Circuit’s understanding
of the verb.146
Plaintiff’s liberal construction of the verb “filed” was rejected first by the
lower court and again by the Seventh Circuit.147 The lower court refused to
“simply ignore[] the statute’s use of the word ‘filed,’” and reasoned that
“[e]xpressing an oral complaint is not the same as filing a complaint.”148 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s findings and explained that
Plaintiff’s construction “seem[ed] . . . overbroad.”149 Notwithstanding that
conclusion, the Seventh Circuit indulged Plaintiff and contextualized his
proposed definition of “filed.”150 According to the court, “[i]f an individual
told a friend that she ‘filed a complaint with her employer,’ we doubt the friend
would understand her to possibly mean that she merely voiced displeasure to a
The Seventh Circuit also considered the “natural
supervisor.”151
understanding” of the word and reasoned that the verb “filed” imposes an
expectation of a writing.152
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the circuit split on this issue.153 In fact,
the court confronted the split by evaluating the strength of other courts’
opinions.154 In response to opinions that conferred a liberal interpretation on

141. Id.
142. Id. at 839.
143. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 608, 613 (W.D.
Wis. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011);
Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839.
148. Kasten, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 612–13.
149. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839–40.
150. Id. at 839.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839–40.
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Section 215(a)(3), the Seventh Circuit noted that those opinions glossed over
the presence of the verb “filed” and declined to define it.155
The Seventh Circuit also compared the language of the Act’s antiretaliation provision to analogous federal anti-retaliation statutes.156 This
analytical exercise convinced the court that a narrow interpretation of the
phrase “file any complaint” was justified “by the fact that Congress could
have, but did not, use broader language in the FLSA’s retaliation provision.”157
Hence, the court concluded that the use of the verb “filed” in place of
“opposed” limits the scope of protected conduct.158
The court closed its analysis with a nod to the remedial nature of the Act,
which “warrants an expansive interpretation of its provisions.”159 Rather than
reading the Act’s animating spirit as a license to expand Section 215(a)(3), the
Seventh Circuit issued an admonition about conferring a broad interpretation
of the Act’s anti-retaliation provision: “[E]xpansive interpretation is one thing;
reading words out of a statute is quite another.”160 The Seventh Circuit, unlike
other courts, paid homage to the language of the statute and refused to conflate
the statute’s remedial and humanitarian purpose with the statute’s actual
language.161
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE INTERPRETATIVE DANCE PERFORMED
BY COURTS
“The law has many gaps in which it fails to provide answers for
judges”162—along with lawyers and American citizens. These gaps often
become the subject of litigation.163 In such instances, the task of interpreting
legal language has been entrusted to the courts.164 To construe statutory text,

155. Id.
156. Id. at 840.
157. Id.
For example, analogous provisions in other statutes, including Title VII and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, forbid employers from retaliating against any
employee who “has opposed any practice” that is unlawful under the statutes. . . . This
broader phrase, “opposed any practice,” does not require a “fil[ing],” and has been
interpreted to protect verbal complaints.
Id.
158. Id.
159. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840 (quoting Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 857 (7th
Cir.1999)).
160. Id.
161. See id. at 838–40.
162. Greenawalt, supra note 99, at 437.
163. See supra notes 20–22, 82–83 and accompanying text.
164. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 2 (1994);
PHILBRICK, supra note 89, at 34.
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courts seek guidance from an arsenal of analytical tools.165 Courts typically
consult and apply canons of statutory construction—canons that “set default
rules to assist in interpretation.”166 However, because canons of interpretation
establish guidelines rather than rules, “[t]he practice of statutory interpretation
does not follow any single inquiry.”167 In addition to following the canons,
judges may decide cases by considering public policy, legislative history,
community values, or stare decisis.168 Nevertheless, the “canons are
particularly popular today,” and most courts abide by them.169
A.

Statutory Interpretation in Broad Strokes

Courts often begin statutory analysis with “the language of the statute
itself.”170 An examination of the law’s text tends to lead to the application of
the “plain meaning rule.”171 The “plain meaning rule” calls for an
interpretation of legislation “on the basis of the wording of the legislation
itself, without reference to the legislature or the debates that surrounded the
creation of the legislation, or to any other sources for judgment.”172 The “plain
meaning rule” encourages courts to consider the absence and presence of every
word, in part, because no word is to be deemed superfluous.173 In addition to a
close analysis of the statutory text at issue, courts may refer to the statute’s

165. For a detailed discussion of the canons of construction upon which courts rely in
interpreting statutes, see generally YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 1 (2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.
166. Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2007).
167. ESKRIDGE, supra note 164, at 13.
168. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and
Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 656, 661 (1992).
169. Id. at 665, 667.
170. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (“We
begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a
statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”); KIM, supra note 165, at 2.
171. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534. U.S. 438, 450 (2002); KIM, supra note 165, at 2;
Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 320 (1985)
(“For that rule [the plain meaning rule] urges that the ordinary meaning can be so plain in some
cases that a court need look to nothing else in carrying out its interpretive task.”).
172. JOHN GIBBONS, FORENSIC LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE IN THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 21 (2003).
173. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004) (reasoning that a
court is loath to read a statute in a manner that would render part of it superfluous); TRW Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)) (“It is a
‘cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so
construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.’”); Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882) (“It is the duty of the court to
give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute . . . .”).
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other provisions to determine whether the text has a plain meaning.174 Courts,
rightfully so, decline to read the disputed text in isolation and “consider the
context in which the statutory words are used.”175 If, upon a close analysis of
the statutory text, the court concludes that the language is unambiguous, the
inquiry ceases;176 “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what
it means and means in a statute what it says there.”177 Hence, theoretically, the
application of the “plain meaning rule,” limits a court’s authority to rewrite
statutory text.
If, however, a close textual analysis of statutory text reveals that the text is
susceptible to different interpretations, courts generally turn to secondary
sources for answers.178 If the ambiguity is caused by a word, ambiguous words
“are customarily given their ordinary meanings, often derived from the
Dictionaries are commonly perceived as authoritative
dictionary.”179
sources;180 however, their value, in terms of aiding the judiciary with
interpretive missions, is questionable for several reasons.
First, dictionary definitions are not always clear.181 Second, most
dictionaries include multiple entries for each word.182 Third, “dictionaries do
not settle meanings”;183 they merely reflect common usage.184 In other words,
definitions are not divined from grammarians or linguists;185 rather, definitions

174. KIM, supra note 165, at 2.
175. Ayes v. U.S. Dep’t. of Veterans Affairs, 473 F.3d 104, 108 (4th Cir. 2006).
176. Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 450; Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)
(quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (“When the words of a statute are
unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”); KIM, supra
note 165, at 2 (“[I]f the language of the statute is clear, there is no need to look outside the statute
to its legislative history in order to ascertain the statute’s meaning.”).
177. Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 461–62 (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank, 503 U.S. at 253–54); see, e.g.,
United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 103 (1897) (“He is presumed to know the meaning of
words and the rules of grammar. The courts have no function of legislation, and simply seek to
ascertain the will of the legislator.”); Oneale v. Thornton, 10 U.S. 53, 68 (1810) (“Men use a
language calculated to express the idea they mean to convey.”).
178. See infra notes 179, 193, 195 and accompanying text.
179. KIM, supra note 165, at 6; see FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (“[W]e construe
a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning” if that term is not defined in
the statute itself).
180. KIM, supra note 165, at 6.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. PHILBRICK, supra note 89, at 32.
184. O’CONNER & KELLERMAN, supra note 15, at xvii (“People often ask me who decides
what’s right. The answer is we all do. Everybody has a vote. The ‘rules’ are simply what
educated speakers generally accept as right or wrong at a given time. When enough of us decide
that ‘cool’ can mean ‘hot,’ change happens.”); PHILBRICK, supra note 89, at 32 (“Dictionaries
follow usage; they do not decide or lead it.”).
185. O’CONNER & KELLERMAN, supra note 15, at 43.
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are determined by the American people, the speakers of English.186 Therefore,
dictionaries do not dictate what is right and wrong; they simply archive
modern usage. For example, “[t]he words ‘gantlet’ and ‘gauntlet[]’ . . . have
become so mixed up in people’s mouths—and minds—that dictionaries now
say it’s OK to use them interchangeably.”187 One finds this “even when a new
usage collides with an old established rule. If enough people break it, the [old]
rule is dumped.”188 “This is how today’s blunder in . . . meaning may become
tomorrow’s standard usage.”189 Since “[d]efinitions are fixed by usage,” and
“[d]ictionaries follow usage[,]”190 courts should view entries in a dictionary as
linguistic snapshots. Indeed, Judge Learned Hand cautioned against judicial
reliance on the dictionary and believed that “it is one of the surest indexes of a
mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the
Similarly, Justice Stevens warned against the use of
dictionary.”191
dictionaries as a panacea for ambiguity in law.192
In addition to or aside from the dictionary, courts may also seek analytical
guidance from the law’s legislative history.193 “The legislative history of a
statute is the history of its consideration and enactment.”194 Further, some
courts, when analyzing a statute’s legislative history, also consider
congressional intent.195
However, other courts snub the import of
congressional intent because “[j]udges interpret laws rather than reconstruct
legislators’ intentions.”196 Those who ignore congressional intent may do so
because “[t]he search for a subjective and uniform intent motivating the
hundreds of members of Congress who voted for a statute is . . . almost always
a chimera” because “legislation is a compromise, the product of alternately

186. See supra note 184.
187. O’CONNER & KELLERMAN, supra note 15, at 153.
188. Id. at xvii.
189. Id.
190. PHILBRICK, supra note 89, at 32.
191. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (emphasis added).
192. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 113 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In a contest
between the dictionary and the doctrine of stare decisis, the latter clearly wins.”).
193. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (“[W]e do not resort to legislative
history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.”); United States v. Great N. Ry. Co., 287 U.S. 144,
154–55 (1932) (“In aid of the process of construction we are at liberty, if the meaning be
uncertain, to have recourse to the legislative history of the measure and the statements by those in
charge of it during its consideration by the Congress.”); KIM, supra note 165, at 39–40.
194. Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
195. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993) (“Our task is to give effect to the will of
Congress . . . .”).
196. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); accord
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004) (quoting Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)) (“‘[I]t is ultimately the provisions of
our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”).
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opposing and cooperating political forces that may ultimately vote in favor of
the same bill while harboring diametrically opposite intentions.”197
When it comes to statutory interpretation or interpretation of any legal
language, courts are not bound by the canons. “[C]anons of [statutory]
construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the
meaning of legislation . . . .”198 Courts are free to deviate from these
conventions and “superimpose[] various presumptions favoring particular
substantive results.”199 Because the canons are “merely axioms of experience”
and “variables render every problem of statutory construction unique[,]”200
there is no mandatory approach to statutory interpretation.
B.

Lower Courts’ Interpretations of the Word “Filed”

Hordes of courts have interpreted the reach of Section 215(a)(3).201 The
majority of circuits have opted for a liberal construction of the Act’s complaint
clause.202 However, a minority of circuits held that an expansive interpretation
is not warranted by the language of the statute.203 In light of the conflicting
197. In re Kiefer, 276 B.R. 196, 201 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2002).
198. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992); accord Chickasaw Nation v.
United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,
115 (2001)) (“For one thing, canons [of statutory interpretation] are not mandatory rules. They
are guides that ‘need not be conclusive.’”).
199. KIM, supra note 165, at 1; see, e.g., United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by
James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir. 1934) (considering practical implications when construing
the word “obscene”). The Second Circuit was presented with the task of interpreting the word
“obscene” as used in Section 305(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 when the Collector seized the novel
Ulysses, a book penned by Irishman James Joyce. Id. at 706. The court’s analysis of the term
“obscene” was geared toward the practical implications of its interpretation. Id. at 707. Judge
Learned Hand reasoned that “[i]f these [characteristics] are to make the book subject to
confiscation, by the same test Venus and Adonis, Hamlet, Romeo and Juliet, and the story told in
the Eighth Book of the Odyssey . . . as well as many other classics, would have to be suppressed.”
Id.
200. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 (1952).
201. A search conducted on LexisNexis for court opinions that comment on the scope of
Section 215(a)(3) returned over 900 matches.
202. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1008 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that “several circuits”
have held oral complaints as protected by the Act); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35,
43 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[W]e, like many of our sister circuits, conclude that the animating spirit of
the Act is best served by a construction of § 215(a)(3) under which the filing of a relevant
complaint with the employer . . . may give rise to a retaliation claim.”); Brock v. Richardson, 812
F.2d 121, 125 (3d Cir. 1987); Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984);
Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975).
203. Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993), overruled by Kasten v. SaintGobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance
Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.),
and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); O’Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661, 664–
65 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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jurisprudence, this portion of the article will explore the underpinnings of
courts’ incompatible conclusions about the meaning of the verb “filed.”
1.

First Circuit

As a threshold issue, the First Circuit considered whether the language of
Section 215(a)(3) has a plain meaning.204 The court found that the phrase
“filed any complaint” was “susceptible to differing interpretations.”205
However, the First Circuit reasoned that “[t]he strongest case for nonambiguity rests perhaps with the verb ‘filed.’”206 The court acknowledged the
significance of Congress’s use of the word “filed” instead of “making” or
“voicing.”207 To determine the “true” meaning of the word “filed,” the First
Circuit sought interpretative guidance from Webster’s Dictionary.208
The court declined to rule on the scope of Section 215(a)(3).209
Nevertheless, it reasoned that the inquiry of whether an employee “filed any
complaint” is fact sensitive and should be decided on a case-by-case basis.210
The court qualified the word “filed,” explaining that “not all abstract
grumblings will suffice to constitute the filing of a complaint.”211 Moreover,
the First Circuit concluded that “‘[t]here is a point at which an employee’s . . .
comments are too generalized and informal to constitute ‘complaints’ that are
‘filed’ with an employer within the meaning of the [statute].’”212
2.

Fourth Circuit

In O’Neill v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co., District Judge T.S. Ellis
began his analysis with the language itself and reasoned that the “provision
could scarcely be clearer.”213 Consequently, the district court held that the
anti-retaliation clause is triggered only when an employee engages in conduct

204. Valerio, 173 F.3d at 41. Valerio v. Putnam Associates, Inc. is the seminal case about the
scope of the Act’s anti-retaliation provision in the First Circuit and has been cited over 100 times.
One of its oft-cited holdings is that the Act’s anti-retaliation statute does not require an employee
to file a complaint with a governmental or administrative agency in order to trigger the
provision’s protection. Id. at 45.
205. Id. at 41.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Valerio, 173 F.3d at 45 (“We conclude, as did the panel in Clean Harbors, that we have
little choice but to proceed on a case-by-case basis, addressing as a matter of factual analysis
whether the internal communications to the employer were sufficient to amount to the ‘filing of
any complaint’ within the statutory definition.”).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 44.
212. Id.
213. O’Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661, 663 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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specifically identified by Section 215(a)(3).214 The court explained that
because the statute does not identify purely oral complaints as protected
activity, such conduct is not sufficient to trigger the Act’s protection.215
Next, the court compared the language of Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision with Section 215(a)(3) of the Act.216 Unlike Section 215(a)(3), the
court noted, the language of Title VII contains the word “opposed,” and as
such, has been interpreted expansively.217 The juxtaposition of the antirelation clauses of Title VII and the Act convinced the court that “[Congress]
must be held to have said what it meant.”218 Accordingly, the absence of the
verb “oppose” and presence of the verb “filed” in Section 215(a)(3) reinforced
the court’s narrow interpretation.219 Judge Ellis concluded his opinion with an
ultimatum: “Should Congress, on reflection, consider sound public policy to
require a different result, it may follow the example of Title VII and amend the
FLSA to add an ‘opposition clause.’”220
3.

Fifth Circuit

In 2008, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the scope of Section 215(a)(3).221
The court began its analysis by reviewing the district court’s findings.222 The
Fifth Circuit held that purely oral protests constitute protected activity under
the statute and explained that a broad interpretation of Section 215(a)(3)
furthers the Act’s goals.223 To temper the court’s expansive interpretation, the
Fifth Circuit reasoned that an employee’s informal complaint must allege a
violation of the Act and not merely a “potential illegality.”224
4.

Sixth Circuit

In EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools, the Sixth Circuit spilled minimal
ink in its interpretation of Section 215(a)(3).225 The court cited an opinion
from the Third Circuit, which explained: “[A]n informal complaint by an
employee is sufficient to bring [that] employee under [the] Act; a formal filing

214. Id. at 664.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. O’Neill, 956 F. Supp. at 664.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 665.
221. Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 624, 626 (5th Cir. 2008).
222. Id. at 624–25 (“[T]he district court found that even an informal, internal complaint could
constitute protected activity under the FLSA.”).
223. Id. at 626.
224. Id.
225. See EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989–90 (6th Cir. 1992).
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is not necessary.”226 Next, the Sixth Circuit emphasized the temporal sequence
of events that gave rise to the lawsuit and concluded that because Plaintiff’s
termination occurred after she “filed” a complaint, Plaintiff had successfully
presented a prima facie case of retaliation.227
Judge Suhrheinrich of the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the majority’s
analysis and prepared a dissent.228 His dissent examined the language of
Section 215(a)(3) and identified three categories of protected conduct.229
Accordingly, because Plaintiff had failed to engage in one of the three
enumerated categories of protected conduct, Judge Suhrheinrich concluded that
Plaintiff had not earned the protection of Section 215(a)(3).230 If Plaintiff had
brought her action under Title VII, the dissent posited, Plaintiff would have set
forth a valid claim of retaliation.231 The dissent explained that “Title VII
expressly includes an opposition clause, which protects employees who protest
unlawful employment practices”232 whereas “Section 215(a)(3) contains no
such provision.”233 Judge Suhrheinrich refused to expand the Act’s antiretaliation clause and concluded that oral protests do not constitute protected
activity.234
5.

Ninth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with a sampling of circuit courts that
have interpreted Section 215(a)(3) broadly.235 The Ninth Circuit held that the
Act’s anti-retaliation is entitled to a broad construction.236 If Section 215(a)(3)
were applied in a narrow manner, the court reasoned, “such a construction
would leave employees completely unprotected by the FLSA against
retaliatory discharge when they complain to their employers about violations

226. Id. at 989 (citing Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124–25 (3rd Cir. 1987)).
227. Id. at 989–90.
228. Id. at 990 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
229. Id. (“(1) filed a Fair Labor Standards Act (‘FLSA’) complaint, (2) instituted an FLSA
proceeding, or (3) testified in an FLSA proceeding.”).
230. Romeo Cmty. Schs., 976 F.2d at 990 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
231. Id. (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
232. Id. (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233. Id. (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234. Id. (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
235. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The First, Third, Sixth, Eight,
Tenth, and Eleventh circuits have all held that complaints similar to, and even far more ‘informal’
than those lodged by the plaintiffs here entitle the employee to coverage under the anti-retaliation
provision of the FLSA.”).
236. Id. at 1004.
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of the Act.”237 The court’s overriding concern in construing the reach of
Section 215(a)(3) was to effectuate the goals of the Act.238
Later in its analysis, the Ninth Circuit commented on the language of the
statute.239 The court characterized the language as “possibly subject to
differing interpretations.”240 The circuit court acknowledged the all-inclusive
language included in Title VII and the absence of similar language in the Act’s
anti-retaliation provision, but reasoned that the linguistic difference is not
dispositive.241 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress could
not be held the meaning of words chosen for Title VII when construing a
similar provision in the Act.242 To explain away the linguistic discrepancies,
the court reasoned that the Act, unlike Title VII, was enacted “at a time when
statutes were far shorter and less detailed, and were written in more general
and simpler terms.”243
6.

D.C. Circuit

The D.C. Circuit began its analysis by canvassing opinions handed down
by various circuit courts.244 The D.C. Court explored the consequences of
interpreting the anti-retaliation provision in both a narrow and broad
manner.245 In support of a narrow interpretation, the court cited opinions from
the Second and Fourth Circuits246 and reasoned that “Congress knows how to
be broad when it wants to be broad.”247 Next, the D.C. Circuit reviewed
opinions that held that Section 215(a)(3) is entitled to a liberal construction.248
In doing so, the court identified a common thread: “[M]ost of them note[d]
important Supreme Court decisions indicating that FLSA [the Act] should not
be interpreted too narrowly . . . .”249 The D.C. Circuit refrained from defining

237. Id.
238. Id. at 1003–04.
239. Id. at 1004–05.
240. Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1004 (emphasis added).
241. Id. at 1005.
242. Id.
243. Id. (“The fact that Congress decided to include a more detailed anti-retaliation provision
more than a generation later, when it drafted Title VII, tells us little about what Congress meant at
the time it drafted the comparable provision of the FLSA.”).
244. Rodriguez v. P.R. Fed. Affairs Admin., 338 F. Supp. 2d 125, 130 (D.D.C. 2004), rev’d,
435 F.3d 378 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Rodriguez, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 130.
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the reach of Section 215(a)(3), but expressed a preference for a narrow
construction.250
C. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of the Fair Labor Standards Act
Prior to granting certiorari to the Kasten case, the Supreme Court had
relegated the interpretation of Section 215(a)(3) to the country’s lower
courts.251 Over the years, however, the Court has issued opinions on other
provisions of the Act.252 In 1942, the Court agreed to interpret the word
“wages” in Section 206(a)253 and defined in Section 203(m);254 the issue in that
case was whether tips could be treated as wages.255 Upon acknowledging the
word’s statutory definition, the Court assessed the word’s connotation, which it
extrapolated from the Act’s legislative purpose.256 The Court also considered
the ordinary meaning of the term “wages” as well as the absence of any
qualifiers, such as “tip.”257 Had Congress intended the term “wages” to
include tips, the Court reasoned, by a stroke of the legislative pen, such a
provision could have been drafted.258 The Court also examined the meaning of
the word “wages” in other pieces of federal legislation and concluded that it
lacked a uniform, fixed meaning.259
In 1949, the Supreme Court defined the word “agriculture” pursuant to its
inclusion in Section 13(a)(6) of the Act.260 The Court considered the contours
of the word “agriculture” as understood apart from its use in law.261 Further,
“the . . . Act provides a carefully considered definition [of the word

250. Id. at 130–31 (“The narrow holdings of the Second and Fourth Circuits are more
consistent with FLSA’s language, but we do not know enough to apply that language with
precision.”).
251. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1330 (2011)
(describing the circuit split regarding protection of oral complaints under section 215(a)(3)).
252. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 129 (1988); Tony & Susan Alamo
Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 295 (1985); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,
361 U.S. 288, 289 (1960); Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 756
(1949); Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U.S. 386, 390 (1942).
253. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2006); Williams, 315 U.S. at 390–91, 391 n.4. Section 206(a) of the
Act provides: “Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is
engaged in commerce . . . wages at the following rates . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 206(a).
254. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m); Williams, 315 U.S. at 390–91, 391 n.4.
255. Williams, 315 U.S. at 390.
256. Id. at 404 (“What the word ‘wages’ connotes in addition to the items specified, we must
deduce from other provisions of the act in the light of its legislative purpose.”).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 404–07.
260. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 756, 757 (1949) (Section
13(6) exempts persons employed in agriculture from the reach of the Act).
261. Id. at 760–62.
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‘agriculture’],”262 which, the Court noted, “is of substantial aid in helping us to
make that determination.”263 Although helpful, the definition did not end the
Court’s inquiry, and the Court sought additional guidance from secondary
sources.264 However, it “refused to pervert the process of interpretation by
[seeking assistance from the dictionary and] mechanically applying definitions
in unintended contexts.”265 Having rejected the dictionary, the Court examined
the statute’s legislative history.266
Ten years later, the Supreme Court was asked to rule on an issue that
implicated Section 215(a)(3) of the Act.267 “The question for decision [wa]s
whether, in an action brought by the Secretary of Labor to enjoin violations of
§ [2]15(a)(3), Section 17 empowers a District Court to order reimbursement
for loss of wages caused by an unlawful discharge . . . .”268 In that opinion,
Justice Harlan reasoned the Act’s anti-retaliation clause was designed to
“foster a climate in which compliance with the substantive provisions of the
Act would be enhanced.”269 Specifically, Section 215(a)(3), according to the
Court, was enacted to insulate employees from economic reprisal if they
reported an employer’s unlawful employment practices.270
In 1985, the Supreme Court analyzed Section 203(r) of the Act; at issue
was the scope of the word “enterprise.”271 The Court observed that in the past,
the Act had been interpreted broadly in order to effectuate its goals.272 The
Court also considered the Act’s legislative history, including the effects of the
Act’s 1961 amendment.273
Three years later, the Supreme Court construed “the meaning of the word
‘willful’ as used in [Section 255(a) of the Act].”274 The Court began its
analysis by examining the statute’s legislative history, which revealed that the

262. Id. at 762.
263. Id.
264. See id. at 763–65, 763 n.10 (examining company by-laws and legislative history to aid in
defining “agriculture”).
265. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 337 U.S. at 764.
266. Id. at 764–65.
267. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 289 (1960).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 289, 292.
270. Id.
271. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 293, 295 (1985)
(examining Section 203(r) of the Act, which defines the word “enterprise”).
272. Id. at 296.
273. Id. at 297–98.
274. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 129 (1988). Section 255(a) provides
for a two-year statute of limitation “if the cause of action accrues on or after [the date of the
enactment of this Act] . . . except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be
commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2006).
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Act had been amended.275 Accordingly, the Court contemplated the effects of
Congress’s amendment on the statute’s meaning.276 Another strand of analysis
involved the Court’s consideration of the ordinary meaning of the word
“willful.”277 To accomplish this task, guidance was sought from Roget’s
International Thesaurus.278 The Court concluded that the word “willful,”
which makes frequent appearances in the law, means that the “employer either
knew or showed reckless disregard.”279
Justice Marshall, joined by two other Justices, disagreed with the
majority’s construction of the word “willful.”280 They agreed that the Court’s
narrow construction of the Act’s language frustrates the remedial purpose of
the legislation.281 In reaction to the majority’s use of a thesaurus, Justice
Marshall argued “the dictionary includes a wide variety of definitions[,]”
including the “definition urged by the Secretary [Plaintiff].”282
IV. THE TENOR OF ORAL ARGUMENTS, THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING, AND
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT’S DECISION
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments for the Kasten case on October
13, 2010.283 In total, there were four waves of arguments. First, on behalf of
Appellant, Mr. Kaster argued that Section 215(a)(3) is entitled to a broad
interpretation.284 Next, Jeffrey Wall, Assistant to the Solicitor General, as
amicus curiae, appeared before the Court in support of Appellant.285 Appellee
Saint-Gobain’s attorney, Mr. Phillips, urged the Justices of the Court to
interpret the word “filed” in a narrow manner.286 Mr. Kaster, who reserved
time for rebuttal, rounded out oral arguments by reiterating his opening
argument.287

275. McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 132 (noting that prior to its amendment, Section 255(a) did not
distinguish between willful and nonwillful violations).
276. Id. (reasoning that “Congress intended to draw a significant distinction between ordinary
violations and willful violations”).
277. Id. at 133.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 135–36 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 138 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has adopted a definition of ‘willful’
that is improperly narrow in light of its effect on the remedial scope of the FLSA.”).
282. Id. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
283. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.,
131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (No. 09-834).
284. Id. at 3–16.
285. Id. at 16–26.
286. Id. at 26–50.
287. Id. at 50–54.
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Oral Arguments: The Court’s Comments, Questions, and Concerns

In response to Mr. Kaster’s opening statement, “filing includes an oral
communication,”288 Justice Alito inquired about the common usage of the verb
“filed.”289 Similarly, Justice Sotomayor tested Mr. Kaster’s definition of the
word “filed” by posing a hypothetical.290 The hypothetical revolves around an
employee who, during a cocktail party, approaches a government employee
and complains about the employer’s illegal practices.291 After contextualizing
the word “filed” with a hypothetical, Justice Sotomayor asked Mr. Kaster to
define the verb “filed.”292 Following Mr. Kaster’s response, Justice Alito
commented on the word’s ordinary meaning.293 Justice Alito also keyed in on
a practical implication of construing the word “filed” liberally: absent a
formality requirement, the issue of whether an employee engaged in protected
conduct, that is whether an employee’s alleged oral complaints were in fact
communicated to the employer, will be more readily disputed and
disputable.294
Justice Ginsburg brought the Court’s attention back to the language of the
statute and noted that “every other time the word ‘file’ is used . . . it refers to a
writing.”295 She urged Mr. Kaster to explain why the Court should adopt an
interpretation “that deviates from the standard meaning of the term in the very
Act at issue.”296 After Mr. Kaster’s response, Justice Sotomayor asked Mr.
Kaster, for a second time, to define the word “filed.”297 Mr. Kaster reiterated
that “[i]t means to submit or lodge.”298 To assess the merit of Mr. Kaster’s
definition, Justice Scalia reasoned that if filed means to submit or lodge that
Mr. Kaster was currently filing a complaint before the Court.299 Scalia, incited
by such reasoning, remarked: “Now come on, people don’t talk like that. . . .

288. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 3.
289. See id. at 4. Justice Alito explored the bounds of the verb “filed” with a hypothetical fact
pattern. Id. “Now, there’s—something’s going on in the workplace and the supervisor happens
to be walking by, maybe a machine is broken, an employee has been hurt, and an employee walks
up to the supervisor who is walking briskly by, taps the supervisor on the shoulder and says the
company is violating the Fair Labor Standards Act because of the placement of a clock. . . .
Would that be the filing of a complaint?” Id.
290. Id. at 4–5.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 5.
293. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 6 (“It’s one thing to say that filing
doesn’t necessarily mean that something is written, although that’s usually what the word means,
isn’t it?”).
294. Id. at 7.
295. Id. at 10.
296. Id. at 10–11.
297. Id. at 12–13.
298. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 13.
299. Id.
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That—that—that is absurd. You are not filing an argument right now.
Nobody uses the language that way.”300
Amicus curiae, Mr. Wall, began his argument by paying deference to the
Court’s pragmatic concerns of according “filed” a liberal interpretation.301 To
convince the Court that an expansive interpretation is warranted, he explained
that more than twenty statutes contain analogous language and that the
majority of those statutes protect all forms of complaints.302 Mr. Wall was
directed by Justice Scalia to consider the year in which the Act was passed;303
Justice Scalia also requested Mr. Wall to compare the language of the National
Labor Relations Act’s anti-retaliation clause with Section 215(a)(3) of the
Act.304 Following Mr. Wall’s comparison, Justice Ginsburg turned the Court’s
attention to the practical purpose of a written complaint: “to give the employer
notice that something is amiss.”305 Justice Kennedy, like Justice Alito, was
interested in whether a broad interpretation of the Act’s anti-retaliation
provision would invite litigation.306
On behalf of Appellee Saint-Gobain, Mr. Phillips commenced his
argument by describing Appellant’s proposed meaning of Section 215(a)(3) as
an “inherently unworkable standard.”307 Mr. Phillips conclusion prompted this
question from the Court: “What makes this worse than these other statutes?”308
Following Mr. Phillips’s answer, Justice Ginsburg guided the conversation to
context, but rather than context today, context in 1938, the year the statute was
enacted.309 Justice Ginsberg also asked Mr. Phillips whether “Congress . . .
meant that all complaints are okay” in light of the purpose of the Act, which
was “to protect the workers.”310
The Court instructed Mr. Phillips to compare the phrase “filed any
complaint” with similarly-worded provisions in “Title VII, The Age
Discrimination Act, [and the] Disabilities Act[.]”311 Next, revisiting a concern
raised earlier in oral arguments by Justice Alito, the Court asked Mr. Phillips to
comment on the likelihood and frequency of disputes arising over whether an

300. Id.
301. Id. at 16–17.
302. Id. at 16.
303. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 17.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 18.
306. Id. at 7, 26.
307. Id. at 27.
308. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 27.
309. Id. at 31; Nordlund, supra note 32, at 721 (“[T]he FLSA became effective on October
24, 1938.”).
310. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 31.
311. Id. at 34.
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employee orally protested about a violation of the Act.312 Justice Sotomayor
requested an explanation as to why the Court should interpret Section
215(a)(3) narrowly.313 Mr. Phillips explained that the Court should read the
language of the statute “the way it was written and as the way they would have
understood it at the time.”314
B.

Interpretative Tools Employed by the Supreme Court During Oral
Argument

David Mellinkoff, a scholar who has written on the relationship between
language and law, has generated a list of questions to determine whether a
section of “[legal] language is appropriate or inexcusable.”315 The following is
a sample of his questions: “Is that the only way it [the word at issue] can be
used? . . . Did it ever have a definite meaning? . . . Does it have a definite
meaning now? . . . Does this way make meaning more exact than ordinary
English? . . . Is there any good reason for saying it this way now?”316 Many of
the questions posed by the Supreme Court during oral argument are strikingly
similar to the questions on Mellinkoff’s list.317
During oral arguments, the Court repeatedly invited both parties to define
the verb “filed.”318 Justice Sotomayor inquired about the word’s current
definition, the natural understanding of the word today,319 and Justice Ginsberg
called for the term’s definition as understood in 1938.320 To further explore
the scope of the word “filed,” the Court created context by way of
hypotheticals.321 The Court’s interest in contextualizing the word was far from
surprising. After all, “[c]ontext is . . . relevant to determining what comes
within a given sense of a word as used on a given occasion.”322 Moreover, the
Court has a history of recognizing the value of context.323 As Justice Homes
reasoned in 1918, “[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is
312. Id. at 35.
313. Id. at 27.
314. Id.
315. MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 297–98 (“Is it a term of art? . . . Are its edges sharp or
soft? . . . Is that the only way it can be used? . . . Is this the traditional way of saying it? . . .
Does this way make meaning more exact than ordinary English? . . . Is there some requirement
that it be said this way?”).
316. Id. at 298.
317. Compare MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 298, with Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 283, at 11–13.
318. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 5, 12–13.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 31.
321. See, e.g., id. at 4–5, 7, 15–16, 20, 23, 28.
322. JIM EVANS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION 22 (2d ed.
1989).
323. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
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the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.”324
The Justices also inquired about the practical effects of each party’s
construction of Section 215(a)(3)325 and whether such a definition aligns with
the Act’s goals and legislative history.326 Additionally, the Court’s questions,
on multiple occasions, required litigants to compare the language of Section
215(a)(3) with analogous anti-retaliation provisions.327 Notwithstanding the
questions concerning the Act’s goals and legislative history, the Court seemed
most concerned with developing a workable and fitting definition of the word
“filed.”328
C. The Supreme Court’s Ruling
In an opinion penned by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court began its
analysis of the phrase “filed any complaint” with the text of the statute.329
However, the Court veered from the statute itself and devoted its attention to
the meaning of the verb “filed.”330 Prior to fleshing out its analysis, the
Court’s opinion reports that “[t]he word ‘filed’ has different relevant meanings
in different contexts.”331 In a single sentence, the Court paid homage to a
fundamental truth: although we share a common language, one language, that
language creates many realities.332 To ferret out the definition of the word
“filed,” the Court consulted three separate dictionaries.333 Two of the
dictionaries include a definition that contemplates a writing.334 The second
entry in the third dictionary states that “to file is to ‘present in the regular way,
as to a judicial or legislative body, so that it shall go upon the records or into
the order of business.’”335 According to the Court, that definition “permit[s]
the use of the word ‘file’ in conjunction with oral material[,]”336 which “is
significant because it means that dictionary meanings, even if considered

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 7, 35.
Id. at 31, 36, 42–43.
Id. at 10, 27, 34.
Id. at 4–5, 6, 7, 11–13, 31, 40–41.
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1329, 1331 (2011).
Id. at 1331.
Id.
See id.
Id. (using WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, and FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE to define the word “file”).
334. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1331.
335. Id. (quoting 1 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 920 (Isaac K. Funk ed., 1938)).
336. Id.
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alone, do not necessarily limit the scope of the statutory phrase to written
complaints.”337
To buttress the validity of the Court’s construction of the verb “file,” first,
the Court noted that “legislators, administrators, and judges have all sometimes
used the word ‘file’ in conjunction with oral statements.”338 Second, the Court
cited a list of federal regulations, which were promulgated by federal agencies,
that “sometimes permit complaints to be filed orally.”339 Next, the Court
referenced a handful of court opinions where the parties’ dispute concerned or
arose from an oral complaint.340 Yet, the following sentence of the opinion
included a curious confession: most complaints are made in writing.341 To
temper this concession, the Court reframed its inquiry: “[W]e are interested in
the filing of ‘any complaint[,]’” not just the filing of a complaint.342 By
tweaking its approach, the Court reasoned that while the verb “‘filed’ . . .
might suggest a narrow interpretation limited to writings, the phrase ‘any
complaint’ suggests a broad interpretation that would include an oral
complaint.”343
About halfway through the opinion, the Court shifted its gaze back to the
language of Section 215(a)(3) and considered “other appearances of the word
‘filed’ in the Act.”344 Although the verb “filed” populates the text of the Act,
the Court concluded that “its appearance elsewhere in the Act does not resolve
the linguistic question before us.”345 Having parsed the language of the Act to
its satiety, the Court considered other anti-retaliation provisions, but noted that
they use different language, broader language.346 To reconcile this, the Court
proposed two irreconcilable explanations: “[T]he use of broader language
elsewhere may mean (1) that Congress wanted to limit the scope of the phrase
before us to writings, or (2) that Congress did not believe the different
phraseology made a significant difference in this respect.”347 The Court then
stated that the statutory text fails to conclusively answer this question, so it
turned to functional considerations.348
First, the Court addressed the practical effects of according Section
215(a)(3) a narrow interpretation and explained that such an interpretation

337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1331 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1332.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1332.
Id.
Id. 1332–33.
Id. at 1333.
Id.
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“would undermine the Act’s basic objectives.”349 The Court also posed a
rhetorical question: “Why would Congress want to limit the enforcement
scheme’s effectiveness by inhibiting use of the Act’s complaint procedure by
those who would find it difficult to reduce their complaints to writing . . . ?”350
Next, the Court reasoned that a narrow interpretation of Section 215(a)(3)
would “take needed flexibility from those charged with the Act’s
enforcement.”351 Although the Act seeks to protect employees from a
spectrum of unsavory employment practices, the Court admitted that the Act
also seeks to create a statutory scheme that is fair to employers.352 To be fair
to employers, the Court reasoned, “the employer must have fair notice that an
employee is making a complaint that could subject the employer to a later
claim of retaliation.”353
Returning to the statutory text, the Court stated that the phrase “filed any
complaint” denotes a certain degree of formality.354 However, the degree of
formality, according to the Supreme Court, “does not necessarily mean that
notice must be in writing.”355 As such, Section 215(a)(3) is triggered when a
complaint is “sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to
understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights
protected by the statute and a call for their protection.”356 This standard can be
satisfied by both oral and written complaints.357
D. Commentary on the Judiciary’s Interpretations of Section 215(a)(3)
To interpret the Act’s anti-retaliation provision, many, if not most, lower
courts concentrated on the Act’s animating spirit and reasoned that the scope
of Section 215(a)(3) should extend beyond the activities explicitly identified
by the statutory text.358 While the underlying current of a law is important, at
what point “does an interpretation become so outrageous that it [should] be
condemned as an invention?”359 Courts should be wary of magnifying the
importance of the Act’s remedial and humanitarian purpose. A statute’s

349. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1333. (reasoning that the Act proscribes certain employment
practices and does so by relying on information and complaints from employees).
350. Id.
351. Id. at 1334.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1334.
355. Id. at 1335.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. See, e.g., Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008);
Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173
F.3d 35, 42–44 (1st Cir. 1999); Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d 1546, 1548–49 (8th Cir. 1994).
359. TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 180 (2000).
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purpose is not a license to expand the scope of its provisions. It is imprudent
for courts to add words to a statute that Congress has clearly excluded. Had
Congress desired to extend the reach of Section 215(a)(3), it could have done
so with an amendment.
Some lower courts, like the Seventh Circuit, consulted the dictionary for
analytical guidance.360 Mr. Kaster, on behalf of Appellant Kasten, argued that
the word “filed” is synonymous with the word “submitted.”361 If, as Mr.
Kaster claimed, the word “filed” can also mean “submitted,” the mere
possibility that a word can mean one thing does not warrant the expansion of a
piece of federal legislation.362 If courts desire to supplement their analysis by
referring to the dictionary, perhaps they should consult a dictionary whose
copyright corresponds with the year of the Act’s enactment. Alternatively,
courts could consult a dictionary of etymology.363 A dictionary of etymology
or, in this case, a dictionary from the 1940’s would accurately inform the court
of the origins of the word “filed” or how the word “filed” was conceptualized
by those who wrote the statutory text.
Although the Supreme Court ignored the etymology of the verb “filed,” it
sought analytical guidance from three dictionaries, two of which were
published in the 1930’s.364 Two definitions, which were pulled from two
discrete dictionaries, indicate that the word “filed” contemplates a writing.365
However, those definitions appeared to displease the Court. As such, it
scouted for a dictionary entry that cast a wider net.366 The Court found such a
definition.367 The more inclusive definition—to file means to “‘present in the
regular way, as to a judicial or legislative body, so that it shall go upon the

360. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2009),
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); Kasten v.
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 608, 613 (W.D. Wis. 2008), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); Valerio v. Putnam
Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 1999).
361. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838–39; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 11.
362. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839.
363. See, e.g., THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 381 (Robert K. Barnhard & Sol
Steinmetz eds., 1988) (The verb “filed” is defined as “to place (papers, etc.) in order.”). THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY defines the verb “file” as: “place on or in a file.”
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 355 (C. T. Onions et al. eds., 1966).
364. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331 (2011) (The
Court cited WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, which was published in 1934,
WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY whose copyright is 1983, and FUNK &
WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, which was published in
1938.).
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
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records’”368—lent a modicum of credibility to the Court’s next deduction,
which mirrored Plaintiff Kasten’s argument: when a word might have another
meaning, that meaning is just as forceful as the word’s ordinary or principal
meaning.369 The Court characterized this possibility, that a word has dual
meanings, as significant and concluded that because the definitions of “filed”
lacked uniformity, the scope of the word is ambiguous.370
However, the court failed to examine the meaning of the third definition.
The third definition places limits as to when filing constitutes presenting in the
regular way.371 Those limits require an individual to speak before a judicial or
legislative body.372 In this case, Plaintiff Kasten orally complained to his
employer, not a judicial or legislative body.373 Further, prior to invoking the
Act’s anti-retaliation provision, he had not presented his complaint to a judicial
or legislative body.374 Nonetheless, this definition alone was sufficient to
convince the Court that the word “filed” could encompass oral and written
complaints.375 Moreover, this third definition requires the individual’s
statement to “‘go upon the records or into the order of business.’”376 The
phrase “go upon the records” is clear; however, the neighboring phrase “into
the order of business” is far less clear. Rather than consider whether the third
definition applies to the Kasten case, the Court presumed that it did and forged
ahead with its analysis.377 However, had the Court parsed the language of this
definition, its analysis might have been different.
Aside from the possibility that the word “filed” includes oral statements,
the Court noted that “legislators, administrators, and judges have all sometimes
used the word ‘file’ in conjunction with oral statements.”378 The adjective
“sometimes” denotes a lack of agreement, an inconsistency. Had the Court
selected a measure other than sometimes, such as frequently or regularly, this
anecdotal data would carry more force. Also, it would be helpful to know

368. Id. (quoting 1 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 920 (Isaac K. Funk ed., 1938)).
369. See Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1331; Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570
F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (mem.), and vacated, 131 S.
Ct. 1325 (2011); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 3–4, 11.
370. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1331, 1333.
371. See id. at 1331.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 1329.
374. See id. (accepting Plaintiff Kasten’s version of the story, in which he claimed to have
“repeatedly called the unlawful timeclock location to Saint-Gobain’s attention—in accordance
with Saint-Gobain’s internal grievance-resolution procedure”).
375. See Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1331, 1335.
376. Id. at 1331 (quoting 1 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 920 (Isaac K. Funk ed., 1938)).
377. See id.
378. Id. (emphasis added).
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what year and under what circumstances these legislators, administrators, and
judges used the word “file” as a synonym for presenting an oral statement.
E.

The Intersection of Language and Law

In light of the relationship between law and language, a series of connected
considerations materialize when courts are asked to interpret the law. First,
we, as speakers of the English language, wield the power to control the
meaning of words. Accordingly, because dictionaries reflect common usage
and yesterday’s blunder becomes tomorrow’s standard usage,379 we should ask
whether common usage is an appropriate standard upon which to judge a word.
Further, by virtue of our control over language, does it follow that we, the
American people, control the law?
Second, when a court hands down an opinion that defines the “true”
meaning of a word, that decision may shape common usage and thereby
sharpen or blur the definition of a word. If the definition of a word has been
expanded by the judiciary, are courts entitled to commit verbicide with
impunity?380 Verbicide occurs when a person or entity “injur[es] the
language . . . both by helping to break down a serviceable distinction, and by
giving currency to a mere token word in place of one that is alive.”381 If the
judiciary is empowered to define words, we should also ask whether judges
make good linguists.382
Third, because language is not static, how can courts, together with the
American people, counteract the instability of language and by extension, the
instability of law? As our first line of defense, we should recognize that “bad
language usage can hurt good law; good language usage can promote respect
for good law.”383 Accordingly, the pursuit of stability in language and law is
mutually inclusive. As a society, we control language, and to some extent,
law. Therefore, although “language cannot stand still, the main thing for the
public interest is that alterations in vocabulary . . . should not become too
rapid, reckless, and wanton.”384
The American people and the court system should be wary of condoning
injudicious interpretations of words. For language to serve its purpose, words
must signify clear, precise concepts; they must be distinguishable and distinct.
The preservation of language will engender stability in law. A stable language

379. See O’CONNER & KELLERMAN, supra note 15, at xvii.
380. See MARK DAVIDSON, RIGHT, WRONG, AND RISKY: A DICTIONARY OF TODAY’S
AMERICAN ENGLISH USAGE 486 (2006).
381. Id.
382. CHRISTOPHER HUTTON, LANGUAGE, MEANING, AND THE LAW 171 (2009).
383. MELLINKOFF, supra note 5, at 453.
384. GARNER, supra note 1, at xxxix.
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will “enhance[] predictability in the application of law and, hence, liberty.”385
Further, linguistic stability together with precision in law may “reduce[] doubt
and disagreement.”386 The law will be more accessible to American citizens,
and consequently, the need for judicial intervention might decline.387
CONCLUSION
“The paradox of language is that it changes fast and radically, without our
noticing it.”388 Despite the ever-changing nature of language, “this language
has preserved a body of law, given it continuity from backwater beginnings to
world eminence.”389 Given the law’s dependency on language and language’s
malleability, a conflict of interest crystallizes between the two: If language, an
essential ingredient of law, is malleable and ever-changing, how can law
endure and retain clarity?
This interdisciplinary inquiry inspired by Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp. is the subject of a circuit split, which has now
been resolved by the Supreme Court.390 The substantive issue presented by
this case is whether purely oral complaints constitute filing a complaint and are
sufficient to trigger the Act’s protection.391 To determine the reach of the
Act’s anti-retaliation provision, the Supreme Court has identified the “true”
meaning of the word “filed.”392 In doing so, how did the Court reach a
decision, and what does its decision indicate about the relation between
language and law? This case and the Court’s opinion prompts a litany of
linguistic and legal queries, such as whether law should evolve with language;
whether the meaning of legal language should correspond with speakers’
everyday use; and whether Americans and the judiciary should band together
to preserve and honor language by preserving and honoring law.
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